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Thispaper advances the hypothesis that the world debt crisis
was mainly induced by the dramatic rise of US interest rates in the
first half of the eighties. It sees this rise in interest rates
primarily as a result of a tight US monetary policy and excessively
large investment incentives provided by the 1981 Us tax reform. A
welfare analysis shows that the policies could have increased the US
advantage from lending its capital abroad, had they been more
moderately designed. The actual policies, however, were by far too








The international debt crisis began as a problem of the credit relationship between the
USA and its Latin American neighbors. Since 1982 Mealco, Peru, Argentina, and Brazil
have reduced or stopped servicing their debts, and in 1976, 60%ofthese countries' gross
external debts were owed to private American banks.' Since 1982 the crisis has spread to
other areas and European and Japanese banks have also had to write off part of their
claims. African and Asian developing countries, too, have encountered payments
difficulties.
How did this situation come about? Currently at least three different possible
explanations have been offered.
The first attributes the problem to the carelessness of the debtor countries.
These overestimated their ability to repay and underestimated the debt service burden.
The loans were used primarily to finance public expenditure, which brought no pecuniary
return, instead of being used to finance private investment projects, whose revenue could
have helped service the debts (World Development Report 1988).
The second explanation accuses the debtor countries of being unwilling to
pay. It is argued that they could service their debts but that there is no means available to
put pressure on them to meet their obligations. This makes it rational for them to refuse to
pay when they can no longer expect net imports of resources in future (Eaton and
Gersovitz 1981, Eaton, Gersovitz and Stiglitz 1986, Cohen and Sachs 1986, and Niehans
1986).
The third explanation focusses on the behavior of the banks. The expansion
of international banking in the 1900's increased competitive pressures to such a degree that
the banks proved unable to resist the lure of the fast money they expected to earn by
'Calculated from World Debt Tables Vol. I, November 1980, and from tables in Hardy
(1979, p. 192).2
lending to the developing countries —tbisdespite early indications of the very high risks
involved (Emminger 1986 and Waflich 1986).
None of these explanations will be disputed in this paper. The question of
unenforceable daims is certainly extremely important for understanding the longterm
problems of international lending. However, the role played by American economic policy
in the particular debt crisis of the last few years should not be overlooked. The crisis itself
resulted from the combined effects of many different factors, but American economic policy
may have been responsible for the interest rate explosion that occurred at the beginning of
the 1980's at the time the debt rrisis started, and indeed seems to have triggered the latter
off. The explosion of interest rates resulted in enormous capital imports into the US, part
of these were supplied by additional capital exports from other developed countries but
part were funds that otherwise would have been available to the less developed countries.
Attempts to understand the debt crisis cannot afford to ignore this phenomenon.2
Section 2 presents some important empirical trends that characterize the
debt crisis, and Section 3 discusses the role of American economic policy, espedally the
fiscal policy introduced during Reagan's presidency. The fourth section considers whether
this policy and its effects on the world economy were benefidal for the Americans. The
fifth section reaches some conclusions and, in addition, makes some brief comments on the
significance of the American tax reforms of 1986.
2. The Debt Crisis in the Light of International Economic Developments
At the end of 1989 the total external debts of the less developed countries (LDC's)
amounted to almost $ 1.2 trillion. Almost one third of this had accrued since the start of
the international debt crisis in 1982. The increasing indebtedness was not the kind
2Cf. also Tanzi (1989), World Development Report (1988), and Sinn's (1988a) "background
paper" to tnis report.
3World Debt Tables 1989/90, p. 78.3
normally associated with economic growth, and seems threatening particularly when
compared to the other economic aggregates. The development of total LDC external debt
relative to GNP —thedebt ratio —isshown in figure 1. The size that the debt problem has
taken on in the eighties is obvious.
Figure 1: Growing Debt Burden of Less Developed Countries 1970—1990
Debtratio (%)
Sources: World Debt Tables 1980/81, Table 1 and pp. 3, 85, 119, 179, 205, 229;
1987/88 (Vol. I) pp. 2—5, 1989/90 (Vol.1), p. 78. World Economic
Outlook: May 1990, Tables A5, A8, A46.
Note: The debt ratio is defined as the ratio of long term external debt and GNP. The
amount of debt does not include IMP loans and loans of less than one year duration The
value for 1990 is calculated from an estimate of the World Economic Outlook, May 1990.
The growth of the debt ratio does not only reflect LDC borrowing behavior.
The very large changes in the dollar exchange rates in recent years aLso have influenced this
ratio. There are two countervailing effects. On the one hand, a depreciation of the dollar
relative to the currencies of less developed countries leads to a rise in the dollar value of
their GNPs. On the other hand, a depredation of the dollar raises the dollar value of those
debts denominated in currencies other than the dollar. The latter effect seems to be
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stronger than the former, explaining the major part of the growth rate of the LDC debt in
1985 and 1986 (cf. OECD 1987, p.50). While the growth rate in dollar—denominated LDC
debt was as high as in previous years, the growth rate adjusted for exchange rate fActors
had fallen monotonically from 17% in 1982 to 9%, 8%, 3%, and 2% in 1986. Similarly, the
sharp decline in the debt ratio after 1987 cannot only be attributed to debt reduction
operations —whichcertainly were important at the time —partof it was the result of the
temporary dollar appredation in 1988 and 1989.
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Sources: World Economic Outlook: May 1980, Table 2; April 1987, Table A6; April
1988, Table A6, May 1990, Table A6. Historical Statistics: Table 3.2,
1960—1980, 1960—1986. World Development Report: 1987, Table Al, A2.
Main Economic Indicators: August 1988, p. 176, May 1990, pp. 172, 178.
Note: The curves show the value of current per capita GDP divided by the
corresponding value in 1982 when the debt crisis began.
The development of the debt ratio was furthermore influenced by the growth
rate of LDC output. On average, the real growth rate of per capita GDP of less developed5
countriesin the decade before (1972 —1982)was 1.9 %.Sincethen (1982 —1989)the
average growth rate has been 1.3 % and is showing no tendency to improve. As against
this, the growth rate of US per capita output was only 0.8 % in the decade before the crisis
and rose in the following seven years to an average of 3.2 %.Figure2 compares the LDC
growth rate with the growth rates of the OECD countries and the USA. It can be seen
that, in the years before the international debt crisis the LDC growth rate exceeded that of
the USA. However, when the debt crisis emerged, the USA and less developed countries
changed places in the growth rate ra.n.ldng order.




Sources: World Debt Tables: 1980/81, Table 1 and pp. 3, 85, 119, 179, 205, 229;
1982/83, pp. 2, 3; 1987/88 (Vol I), pp. 2—5; 1989/90, p. 78; Survey of
Current Business: 1989, June, Table 8.1; 1990 June, Table 8.1.
Note: The ratio shown in the table is de.ned as FNominal long term LDC debt service —
(USGDP inflation rate size of nominal long term LDC debt)]/nominal LDC GNP.
It is not the debt itself, but the debt service that constitutes the burden for6
less developed countries. Figure 3 shows how the real interest burden has changed relative
to LDC GNP. The real interest burden is defined as the nominal interest burden minus the
inflation—induced reduction in the real value of LDC debt. The latter is calculated using
the US GDP price deflator. Weighted indexes of LDC dollar export or import prices could
have also been used, but, as most of the debts are defined in dollar units and as the dollar
is the most important transactions currency, it. seems appropriate to use the basket of
goods produced in the USA as the numeraire. (To be sure, terms of trade changes have
contributed to the debt crisis, but these changes should not be confused with debt service
effects.)
The figure demonstrates what is arguably the most important single cause of.
the debt crisis: the dramatic rise in the real interest burden in 1982. This is the year in
which Menico declared itself unable to meet its payment commitments and which is seen as
the start of the crisis. Before 1982, LDC's were paying interest but the interest pald was
not sufficient to outweigh inflation losses of the creditor countries. De fActo, LDC's were
being rewarded by their creditors for being willing to look after the latters' money capital.
Their indebtedness was not a burden for less developed countries, on the contrary it
provided them with an ever flowing source of real income. They could afford to continue
borrowing a net amount that was higher than their interest payment obllgations and in the
process were not becoming poorer. Only since 1982 have they actually had to carry an
interest burden. A fundamental change in actual credit conditions occurred in that year, a
change that could in no way be expected to proceed smoothly.
The reason for the changed conditions was the rapid increase in US nominal
and real interest rate levels which quickly spilled over to the rest of the world. The turn of
the decade from the TO's to the 80's was characterized by falling inflation rates combined
with sharply rising interest rates. This resulted in a rise of real long term interest rates in
the US from around zero in 1978/79 to almost 8% in 1984. Since then the rates have fallen7
but have not returned to anywhere near their old levels. As figure 4 shows, the average
real interest rate that the less developed countries actually had to pay on their outstanding
debt was always below the US real long term rate, but its time pattern was similarly
dramatic, showing the same jump in the period before 1984.
FIgure 4: The Pattern of Change in Real Interest Rates in the USA
and the Less Developed Countries
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Sources: Historical Statistics: Table 8.1, 1960—1980, 1960—1986; Survey of Current
Business, Dec. 1988 and May 1990, Table 8.1; Main Economic Indicators,
August 1990; World Debt Tables: 1977, Table 1B, 1G; 1980/81, Table 1;
1982/83, pp. 2,3; 1987/88 (Vol. I), pp.2—4, 1989/90 (Vol. 1), p. 78.
Note: The US real long term interest rate is defined as the nominal interest rate on US
government securities with a maturity of at least five years minus the US GDP inflation
rate. The real LDC interest rate is equal to the average nominal Interest rate paid by
LDC's fbr government and private loans (ercept for IMF loans), with a maturity of at least
one year, minus the US GDP inflation rate.
One reason for the similarity is that both interest rates are calculated using
the US GDP inflation rate. Another reason, however, is the equalizing effect of interest
arbitrage. This arbitrage is of little importance for that part of LDC loans made by public8
authorities. It is, however, very important for the lion's share of the loans which is made by
private banks, the more so as private loans are relatively short term and are therefore
frequently rescheduled. In 1980, for example, according to World Bank estimates, only a
quarter of Latin American countries' debt was very long term; 70% of the loans had a
maturity of less than three years; and 40% had to be paid back in less than one year
(World Debt Tables, Vol I, 1987/88, p. XI). A change in US interest rate levels could
therefore be transmitted very quickly to interest rates on LDC debt.
The picture would appear even more ominous if the real interest rates of the
less developed countries were defined in terms of LDC export goods rather than US ouput
goods. Because the appreciation of the dollar since 1981 reduced the relative price of LDC
exports, the estimates for real interest rates would be even higher for the period following
the crisis (cf. World Debt Tables, April 1988, Table A26). However, interest rates thus
defined may not be very appropriate for evaluating US pollcies.
Capital that otherwise would have been available for other countries was
kept in the USA, or attracted there, by the high US interest rate levels. Initially this took
the form of a run on dollar securities which, concurrent with the ongoing rise in the US real
interest rate, led to a steady rise in the value of the dollar in the first half of the 80's.4
Later, the subsequent normal reaction of the American current account balance resulted in
a very large inflow of capital into the US. From 1985, when the dollar began to fall again,
short run revaluation effects helped US capital imports to reach a peak value of $ 150 b. in
1986 and 1987. As suggested by figure 5, the US was able to import the capital partly by
generating export surpluses in other OECD countries, partly by crowding out LDC capital
imports. From 1982 to 1987, annual US capital imports rose by $ 144 b., exports by other
OECD countries increased by 3 57 b., and LDC capital imports fell by $ 87 b.
4See Siun (1985, 1987b).
51t is true that the Plaza agreement in September 1985 was an international attempt to
reduce the value of the dollar, however, as argued in Sinn (1987b) this attempt had no9
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Sources: Annual Report: Table 8, 1973, 1974. Survey of Current Business Table
5.1, July1974,July 1978, July 1984, July 1986, July 1987, May 1988.
World Economic Outlook 1982, Table 15; April 1988, Table A36, May
1990, Tables A31, A36. Estimates for 1990 from World Economic Outlook
May 1990, Table A33.
The shaxp reduction in the capital imports of the less developed countries
confirms the monotonic fall in the exchange—rate—adjusted growth rate of these countries'
debts, mentioned above, which fell from 17% to 2% between 1982 and 1986. It is true, in
1974 and 1980 there also had been a drastic reduction in LDC capital imports, even to the
extent of a change in sign. In those years, however, the oil price shocks and the resulting
short run export surpluses of the LDC's were responsible. The recent reduction in LDC
capital imports came about despite a worsening of their terms of trade (World Debt
Tables, April 1988, Table A26) and cannot therefore simply be attributed to revaluation
visible impact on the exchange rate. The dollar started to decline in February 1985 and
continued doing so after the agreement. The true explanation for the dollar's decline may
be the antidpation of the 1986 US tax reform which was announced shortly alter President
Reagan had been reelected in Autumn 1984. See also Feldstein (1988) and Sinn (1988a).10
effects. The rapid rise in US real interest rates is undoubtedly a very important factor in
the deflection of the capital flows. The cause of the debt crises is to be sought not only in
the less developed countries themselves but also in the USA, their largest creditor.
3. The Role of American Economic Policy
The sudden explosive increase in American interest rates can be explained in terms of at
least three economic policy measures: the tight monetary policy, the budget deficit, and the
tax incentives for investments introduced by the Reagan government when it took office in
1981.
Figure 6: US Monetary Policy
Growth—
rates (%)
Sources: Historical Statistics: Table 8.1, 1960—1980, 1960—1986. Main Economic
Indicators: 1964—1983, p. 77; Feb. 1986, p. 90; Aug. 1988, p. 94, August
1990, pp. 96, 98, Survey of Current Business, Dec. 1988 and May 1990,
Table 8.1.
Note: The growth rate of the real money supply is defined as the difference between the
growth rates of Ml and the GDP deflator.11
Before the crisis, monetary policy tended to be passive and its effects were
not immediately apparent. In the sixties, the growth rate of the nominal money supply
fluctuated between 4% and 9%, and, until 1982, showed a slightly rising trend. From 1976
the growth rate was never below 6%. Cursory observation would therefore not initially
suggest much of a role for US monetary policy as an explanation for the high American
interest rates. It must be remembered, however, that the inflation rate at the end of the
70's was extremely high and had to a large extent soaked up the nominal growth of the
money supply. As figure 6 shows, the real money supply hardly rose at all and certainly did
not keep pace with the growth of real national product: the Mi/GM' ratio was falling over
the whole decade, contracting each year from 1973 by at least 2%. To this extent, US
monetary policy in the period before the debt crisis was dearly restrictive. Monetary policy
made a decisive contribution to the rise in US interest rates at the beginning of the eighties
and to the subsequent debt crisis.
Under the Reagan administration American budgetary policy took a
particularly dramatic turn, and, despite window—dressing attempts to suggest otherwise, it
was basically of keynesian design. On the one hand, although a supply—side orientation was
clalmed, only half—hearted consideration was given to a reduction in government
expenditure; there was primarily a transfer from social to defense expenditure. On the
other hand, a substantial reduction in tax revenue followed from the passing of the
Economic Recovery Tax Act in August 1981, only nine months after Reagan took office. In
the five years from 1982 to 1986 the cumulative US budget defirit reached what many saw
as the ominous level of $ 630 b.
It has frequently been argued that this deficit was unplanned and that it took
the government by surprise, convinced as it seemed by Laffer's self—financing hypothesis.
However, the truth is different. In the appendix to the Tax Reform Act of 1981, a tax loss12
of 3 744b.had already been predicted for the above—mentioned five year period (Joint
Committee on Taxation 1981) and the Department of the Treasury had in August 1981
independently estimated a tax loss of $ 724 b. In government circles at least, it was fairly
precisely known what to expect.
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Figure 7: US Flow of Funds
Sources: Survey of Current Business: Table 5.1, July 1974, July 1978, July 1982,
July 1984, July 1986, July 1987, May 1988, May 1990.
The US budget deficit had burst out of its usual boundaries and has often
been held solely responsible for the high level of American capital imports in recent years.
As figure 7 shows, this is an obvious interpretation in view of the similarity between the
budget deficit curve and that which shows both the current account deficit and the level of
6U5 Department of the Treasury, Office of Tax Analysis, Table "Changes in Fiscal Year
Receipts Resulting from Conference Agreement on H.R. 4242", The Economic Recovery
Tax Act of 1981, August 3rd, 1981, unpublished.
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capital imports. It would be dill cult to argue that the latest American economic boom, the
high real interest rates, and the capital inflow induced by these had nothing to do with
Reagan's keynesian policies.
Nevertheless, the growth dynamics, which can be seen from figure 2, and the
extent of the American investment boom after 1982, shown in figure 7, are surprising. 1982
saw not only the start of the debt crisis, it was also a year of world wide economic
recession. The increase in investment in the two years following this recession were,
according to a study by Bosworth (1985), twice as large as in all previous boom phases;
these all had a surprisingly stable pattern of acceleration of investment. There is a
coincidence between capital imports and the rise in investment —itis more pronounced
than that between the budget and current account deficits —andthere is an even more
strthng coincidence between the maximum of the real interest rate and the peak of
investment in 1984 (cf. Figures 4 and 7). None of these aspects fit well with the argument
that the rise in interest rates and the capital inflow that followed this were caused by the
tight monetary policy alone, nor do they fit with the argument that expansionary fiscal
policy was the main culprit. According to both arguments, investment would have bad to
he reduced or at least the investment boom, which far exceeded that of earlier upswing
phases, would not have been able to occur.
The incentive effect on investment of the tax rdorm of 1981 may provide an
explanation for the fact that, up to 1984, there was an unusually strong investment boom
despite the rise in real interest rates.7 A new method of tax depreciation —theAccelerated
Cost Recovery System —wasintroduced in addition to the investment tax credit which was
a subsidy of up to 10% of gross investment. Compared to the previous Asset Depreciation
Range System, which was oriented towards the ideal of true economic depredation, the
TBosworth (1985) is rather sceptical of this argument but the following commentary by
Summers makes it dear that Bosworth's estimate of the value of the incentive effect may
be inappropriate.14
new scheme meant that the average depreciation period was approtmatelv halved, and,
combined with the investment tax credit, the reform was equivalent to (in effect) an
immediate write—off system for industrial plant and equipment. This aspect was later put
forward as the official reason for the 1986 tax reform of the Reagan government
(Department of the Treasury 1984, pp. 105—107) and has recently been documented again
by Fullerton, Gilette, and MacIde (1987, p. 144) by means of exact calculations for
individual categories of investment goods.
The effects of the Accelerated Cost Recovery System on international capital
movements have been investigated by the present author elsewhere (Sinn 1984, 1985). On
the basis of a model in which international capital movements come about by means of
loans contracts and in which interest income is taxed on the residence principle, it was
shown that changes in tan rates and depreciation allowances have very different effects on
international capital movements. With true economic depredation (following the
Johannson—Samuelson definition) tax rate changes do not induce capital movements,
because, from the point of view of the individual investor, domestic and foreign
investments are equally affected. In an open economy they affect saving incentives but
have no direct effect on investment. Accelerated depredation allowances, on the other
hand, are measures that selectively promote real domestic investment. In contrast to an
overall fail in tax rates, these allowances raise the capitalized value of domestic investment
projects for every given level of interest rates, thus stimulating the demand for investment
goods and pushing up the level of domestic interest rates from the demand side. This leads
to the exchange rate and current account effects, described in the last section, which make
a real capital inflow possible. A long run, accumulated capital inflow in the order of
magnitude of at least $ 1000 b. was forecast (Sinn 1984). At the time this order of
magnitude appeared excessive in view of the then current US current account deficit, but
by the end of 1990 the value of US capital imports accumulated since the reform of 198115
will have reached approrimately 3390 b., that is, aimost 90% of the predicted level.
The effects of depredation allowances are often underestimated in the
literature, as they "only" cause a temporal shift of the tax burden and not a permanent tax
saving. It is argued that depredation allowances only have a stimulating effect on firms'
investment dedsions in the introduction phase, for tax relief only takes place then. At best,
there will be a permanent tax relief effect in a growing economy, while in a stationary
economy the incentive effect on private investment will soon disappear because the tax
base will approach that under true economic depredation. This view cannot stand up to a
theoretical examination, for it overlooks the fact that an immanent rise in taxes, which
would be brought about by a break in the stream of investment, creates a continuing
investment incentive, even though the effect of accelerated depredation can no longer be
identified by loohng at only the size of the current tax burden.8 In contrast to reductions in
tax rates, depredation allowances do not provide firms with permanent tax relief, but do
nevertheless create strong and lasting investment incentives. They are a cheap means of
stimulating capital formation, a means which the USA has made use of with good reason.
The immediate write—off system that the USA in effect had from 1981 to
1986 did not represent just a marginal change. Under this system, with corporate tax rates
of 46%, American investment projects could carzy a rate of interest twice as large as
projects in countries where depredation rules were oriented towards true economic
depredatioc. In other words, for a given number of investment projects, the capital
demand curve in the US occurred at rates of interest twice as high as those in countries
that had the same production technologies but did not have investment incentives like the
Accelerated Cost Recovery System and the Investment Tax Credit. Looked at in this way,
the predicted and actual capital inflow into the USA is no longer surprising.
Previous investigations of the relationship between Amedcan investment
Cf here the discussion between Neumann (i988) and Sinn (1988b) in the Jahrbucher für
Nationalokonomie und Statistik.16
allowances and the capital inflow have concentrated on capital movements between the
USA and the other OECD countries (cf. Sinn 1984, 1985, 1987a, 1989b). As figure 5 shows,
these movements were indeed very large. It is clear, however, that such investigations can
be carried over analogously to the less developed countries. Compared to the capital
movements that could have been expected to occur if American economic policy had been
neutral, the less developed countries have also lost capital to the USA. As mentioned
above, their capital imports fell annually from about $ 90 b. in 1982 to practically zero in
1987, while US capital imports rose from zero to a good $140 b. in the same period! The
real problem of the debt crisis is tied up with the capital flow back to the USA. The debt
moratoria and the other external characteristics of the crisis are simply the screeching tires
of the capital transport vehicles that were forced to make a sudden sharp turn by the
USA's policy.
4. Ciii Bono?
Who were the gainers and who the losers from the deflection of international capital flows
towards the USA? The short term advantages for the USA are well—known. The Ametican
economy moved closer to full employment than the other OECD countries and its economic
growth reached record heights. It is also dear that the less developed countries were
adversely affected. The drying up of the capital inflow forced them to cut back their
imports radically and they entered a phase of economic stagnation. There are, however,
other long run welfare effects in addition to the obvious short run effects. These long run
effects were to be expected as a result of the American policy of stimulating investment, or
would have had to be expected if the US had not changed the direction of its tax policy
again.
These welfare effects can be illustrated with the use of the
Kemp—Madflougall diagram shown in figure 8. Assume a steady—state world economy with17
a given total capital stock that is available for the USA and the less developed countries.
With given technologies and given supplies of the other factors of production, each country
has a specific marginal product of capital curve net of economic depreciation. In the
diagram, the amount of capital used by the LDC's is measured from left to right and that
of the USA from right to left. The thickly drawn lines are the regional specific (net)
marginal product of capital curves. The combined capital stock of the two countries is
equal to their combined wealth, but the amount of capital employed in one country is not
necessarily equal to that cnuntry's wealth. It is assumed that the USA is rich in the sense
that its wealth is larger than the amount of capital represented by the point of intersection
of the two curves (LN) so that it would be a net lender in the case of an efficient
distribution of the world capital stock. In the diagram, it is assumed that US wealth is
given by rN and that of the LDC's by RI.
Figure 8: Optimal Investment Incentives from the
Point of View of the Creditor Country







It is assumed that international capital movements take the form of bond
trading and loan contracts, and that international interest income flows are taxed in
accordance with the OECD Model Taxation Convention of 1977 (OECD 1977). The latter
means that the residence principle is used and that small source taxes are allowed, but are
credited in the country of residence. Under these conditions capital income taxation does
not affect international portfolio investment even when the national tax rates are different.
For the sake of simplicity, the analysis abstracts from differences between profit or
corporate taxes on the one hand and personal income taxes on the other. This
simplification ensures tbat the taxation systems do not discriminate between retalned
profits and loans as sources of finance and a specification of the firms' financing decisions
can be omitted. International differences in tax rates are permitted.
Suppose, in the LDC's there are no tax investment incentives as there are in
USA and the depreciation rules require true depreciation. Under these conditions, profit
matmizing firms invest up to the level where the marginal product of capital is equal to
the market rate of interest irrespective of the level of domestic taxes. Since this investment
behavior is welfare optimal for each individual LDC which is too small to affect world
interest rates by its own actions, it is assumed that public investment follows similar rules:
official loans to developing countries are used to finance public projects up to the point
where the last project's rate of return equals the market rate of interest. A violation of this
rather heroic assumption would certalnly have impllcations for a welfare theoretic
assessment of the capital market equilibrium from the point of view of the world as a
whole. However, as the following arguments concerning the assessment of this equilibrium
from the point of view of the USA would not be affected, the assumption is an admissible
simplification.
US firms, too, would extend their employment of capital up to the point
where the marginal product of capital equals the interest rate, if tax depreciation19
allowances followed the theoretical ideal of income taxation and there were no investment
incentives in operation. In this case, world capital market equilibrium would be determined
at point D where the two marginal product of capital curves intersect. The world interest
rate would be DL, and the USA would lend an amount IL of its capital to the less
developed countries.
From the point of view of all countries, this situation would be optimal
because world output, the area under the two curves, would be smaller for every other
distribution of capital. However, from the point of view of the USA in isolation, an
optimum would be different. The USA is a large country which can influence world interest
rates by its own actions and thus can gain from carrying out a monopolistic capital supply
policy. The essence of such a policy would be to reduce the supply of capital on world
markets and to lend less capital there under more fkvorable conditions.
In principle, the investment incentives introduced in 1981 are a suitable
means for achieving this reduction. They induce American firms to invest at home beyond
the point where the marginal product of capital equals the market rate o interest and thus
drive the market interest rate upwards, reducing America's net capital supply to less
developed countries. Incentives that maximize US national income or net national product
are optimal for the USA. The allocation of capital that corresponds to this is shown by the
Cournot point C in figure 8. Below this point —atF —themarginal product curve of the
USA, which is also the marginal opportunity cost curve of capital lending, cuts the
marginal revenue curve of capital lending EFK. The marginal revenue is the rise in net
interest income earned in the LDC's when the capital supplied to them increases by one
unit. Marginal revenue is below the market rate of interest because no price discrimination
is possible and because the less developed countries impose source taxes. Without source
taxes, the marginal revenue curve would go through point B. The gross interest, which the
first unit of capital loaned receives, would be equal to its marginal revenue. With source20
taxes, however, the first unit of capital must be content with a net—of—tax return below the
market rate of interest.
In the optimum, US net national product is shown by the hatched area in the
diagram. It consists of the US net domestic product FMNJ plus the net factor income
earned in the less developed countries EFJI. The net national product of the LDC's is
shown by the dotted area and is equal to the difference between net domestic product
ACJH and net factor income EFJI paid to the US. Here the world market interest rate is
CL It equals the marginal product of capital of the LDC's but exceeds the marginal
product of capital of the USA by the amount of the marginal US investment benefit CF.
The marginal investment benefit produces the gap between marginal cost and marginal
revenue that signifies the monopoly solution.
If there were no investment incentives, that is, if the LDC's received loans of
capital equal to IL, the net national product of these countries would be larger by the
amount CDKF, and that of the USA smaller by FDK, than in the monopoly case. For both
countries taken together, there would be a welfare gain of CDF compared to the monopoly
situation, but the USA would be worse off.
On the other hand, if the marginal investment benefit had risen to BC, no
capital at all would have been exported. Compared to the monopoly solution, the LDC's
would have to forfeit an amount of national product equal to BCFE and the USA would
lose the amount of EFG. No one would benefit from this. The best solution from the point
of view of the USA is therefore achieved when it exports capital of amount IJ, and the best
solution from the point of view of the world as a whole would be achieved with an export of
capital of amount IL. So much for the model.
It is obvious that this model is, in many ways, not suitable for describing
precisely the welfare effects of the international debt crisis. In particular, the negative real
interest rates of the seventies make it difficult to identify the equilibrium solution U with21
the world's historical situation before the debt crisis. The model could be suitable,
however, for a welfare analysis that compares alternative scenarios for the development of
the world economy. The end of the seventies represented a disequilibrium situation for the
USA which it wanted to get out of by means of a restrictive monetary policy and large
scale tax reforms. It had the choice between a neutral tax system that would have led to a
world capital market equilibrium at D, or a non—neutral system by means of which
American investment chances would effectively improve at the expense of the rest of the
world. The latter system was chosen.
Whether the policy was quantitatively designed so that the optimal point C
could be reached, or whether it was aimed at reaching it at all is an open question. There
was certainly no conscious attempt to reach an optimum of the nd described above, for
that American policy was far too internally directed. It is more likely that the American
government was quite prepared to put up with the disadvantages to the rest of the world
for the sake of giving its own economy a boost. The search for motives is a futile
undertaking. Economic science does not attach much importance to the question of
whether an economic actor optimizes consciously or not, and it would be quite wrong to
pass a moral judgement on US policy. The analysis presented here makes no attempt to
explain why the US decided to carry out a high interest rate policy, it is simply concerned
with the welfare effects of that policy.
As far as the quantitative aspect is concerned, it seems that the American
policy was too strong to achieve optimal capital imports. After all, the officially estimated
value of US net foreign wealth position (US assets abroad minus foreign assets in the US)
had already become negative in 1984 and since then has fallen below minus $ 660 b. in 1989
(see Survey of Current Business June 1990). Such a result can naturally not be an
indication of an optimizing policy, for no monopolist would let the quantity supplied fall to
zero, let alone become negative. Serious reservations are, however, appropriate insofar as22
the American statistics may not be very accurate. They comprise the unadjusted historical
cost value of capital investments and take no account of the increase in their value since
the time of purchase. Since American investment overseas occurred earlier than foreign
investment in the USA, the stock statistics must show Americans to be poorer than they
really are (see also Amuzegar 1988 and Sinn 1987a, p. 230, n.38). This observation is
confirmed by looking at the flow statistics for the net factor income Americans receive from
overseas. The latter showed that, until 1988, not even the sign for the American wealth
position could have been correct. In 1988, the US was reported to have a net foreign wealth
position of $ —531b., but the net investment income received by the US was $ + 1.6 b. (see
Survey of Current Business, June 1990, Tab. 2). It was not until 1989 that this net income
eventually turned negative. Only now (1990) can there be little doubt that the US is a
debtor country.
So it seems that a more moderate policy of investment incentives might have
helped the US to increase its national advantage from lending capital abroad. The policy
actually chosen was too strong to produce this result.
5. Conduding Remarks and Future Prospects
The US economic policy at the start of the 1980's was a gigantic experiment which caused
all kinds of disruption to the world and which was observed with incredulous astonishment
by many non—US economists. The combined effects of a very restrictive monetary policy,
an exceptionally expansionary budget policy and a massive investment incentive scheme
led to a truly explosive increase in American real interest rates. This in turn drove the
doilar to unanticipated heights and, by way of a current account deficit, induced a huge
inflow of capital into the US. The less developed countries were faced with a sudden,
unexpected change in the conditions of their loans contracts. In the seventies, they had
been, in effect, rewarded in the form of negative real interest rates, for their helpfulness in23
looking after the capitalloanedto them, now they were suddenly faced with the demand
that they actually service their debts. In some countries, the immediate reaction to the
changed conditions was a refusal to pay —thiswas the outward sign that a debt crisis was
occurring. However, the circumstance that the high interest rates forced the less developed
countries to abruptly limit their credit intake was probably even more important. This
limitation resulted in a stagnation phase which increased the debt ratio instead of reducing
it. As a result of American policy the driving forces of economic growth were shifted away
from the less developed countries and the rest of the world to the USA.
This result could have been in the American interest, not only from a short
run point of view, hut also in terms of long run investment strategies, had the policy been
of a more moderate design. The United States, as the formerly largest capital exporter,
could have manoeuvered itself into a position where it could have lent somewhat less
capital to developing countries under more favorable conditions than previously. However,
the policy was too strong to achieve this result and gave rise to capital imports which were
larger than optimal.
Since then, in the light of the magnitude of the reaction to its policy, the US
has become nervous about its own daring. The tax reform introduced in 1986 cancelled
many aspects of the 1981 reform9. In particular, the investment incentives brought in in
1981 were largely set aside. The fall in the dollar from 1985 can be seen as a reaction to the
new tax dorm which had already been announced in 1984.10 It is suggested that this fail will
lead to a long term improvement in the American current account balance and thus to a
drying up of capital imports into the USA. The experiment would then be at an end, and
this would justify a hope for a renewed phase of growth in the less developed countries and
elsewhere in the world with moderate interest rates and loans contracts that can actually
0See Sinn (1989b).
'°See fn. 5.24
be fulfilled by less developed countries. The new American tax system is largely free of
"bribes" for capital, as Samuelson (1964) once called depreciation allowances. Capital can
again flow freely to those countries where it can most usefully be employed. It is to be
boped that the presently less developed countries will be among them.25
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